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Why is semantic change in grammaticalization typically unidirectional? It is a well-
established finding that in grammaticalizing constructions, more concrete meanings tend to 
evolve into more schematic meanings. Jäger & Rosenbach (2008) appeal to the psychological 
phenomenon of asymmetric priming in order to explain this tendency. This article aims to 
evaluate their proposal on the basis of experimental psycholinguistic evidence. Asymmetric 
priming is a pattern of cognitive association in which one idea strongly evokes another (i.e. 
paddle strongly evokes water), while that second idea does not evoke the first one with the 
same force (water only weakly evokes paddle). Asymmetric priming would elegantly explain 
why semantic change in grammaticalization tends to be unidirectional, as in the case of English 
be going to, which has evolved out of the lexical verb go. As yet, empirical engagement with 
Jäger & Rosenbach’s hypothesis has been limited. We present experimental evidence from a 
maze task (Forster et al. 2009), in which we test whether asymmetric priming obtains between 
lexical forms (such as go) and their grammaticalized counterparts (be going to). On the 
asymmetric priming hypothesis, the former should prime the latter, but not vice versa. 
Contrary to the hypothesis, we observe a negative priming effect: speakers who have recently 
been exposed to a lexical element are significantly slower to process its grammaticalized 
variant. We interpret this observation as a horror aequi phenomenon 
(Rohdenburg & Mondorf 2003).
1 Introduction
It is an empirically robust finding that semantic change in grammaticalizing forms,
across different languages and across different historical periods, typically 
proceeds
in one direction only, namely from relatively more concrete and specific meanings
to relatively more abstract and schematic meanings (Heine & Kuteva 2002; 
Hopper
& Traugott 2003). Examples of semantic unidirectionality include pathways such as
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the development of future markers out of motion verbs (e.g. English be going to), or
the emergence of causal connectors out of temporal connectors (e.g. English since).
Meaning changes of this kind have been studied in great detail, and the principal
processes that drive them, notably metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson 1980), metonymy
(Benczes et al. 2011) and invited inferencing (Traugott & Dasher 2002), are reasonably
well understood. What is at present not understood very precisely is why meaning
change in grammatical forms is highly asymmetrical, so that the development of future
markers out of motion verbs (as in be going to) is cross-linguistically very common,
while the inverse process, i.e. the development of a motion verb out of a grammatical
marker of future time, is virtually non-existent. The idea of unidirectionality in
grammatical change, which has a broader scope than just semantic unidirectionality,
has been severely criticized (Campbell 2001; Janda 2001). The source of the criticism
is, however, not the question whether unidirectionality exists, but rather the question
whether or not there are exceptions. Regardless of this issue, unidirectionality is
generally accepted as a strong statistical tendency that is in need of an explanation.
The leading question for this article is therefore the following: why is there a strong
tendency of unidirectionality in grammatical semantic change?
In a programmatic paper, Jäger & Rosenbach (2008) suggest an answer to this
question. They appeal to the psychological phenomenon of asymmetric priming
in order to explain why semantic change in grammaticalization typically evolves
from more concrete meanings towards more schematic meanings. In this article, we
aim to evaluate their proposal on the basis of experimental evidence. We present
experimental evidence from a maze task (Forster et al. 2009), in which we test
whether asymmetric priming obtains between lexical forms (such as go) and their
grammaticalized counterparts (be going to). On the asymmetric priming hypothesis,
lexical go should prime grammatical be going to, but not vice versa. Using a set of
twenty different pairs of lexical forms and grammaticalized counterparts, we do in fact
observe an asymmetric priming effect, which, however, deviates from our expectations.
Our results hint at a negative priming effect: speakers who have recently been exposed
to a given lexical element are significantly slower to process a grammaticalized variant
of that lexical element. We interpret this observation as a horror aequi phenomenon
(Rohdenburg & Mondorf 2003), so that processing the same form twice within a short
time span is difficult for language users, especially if the form is used with different
meanings or functions. The horror aequi effect does, however, have a twist: processing
a grammaticalized element does not slow down the subsequent processing of its lexical
counterpart. As we will explain in more detail below, we hold that differences in the
semantic specificity of lexical elements and their grammaticalized counterparts can
explain this observation.
The remainder of this article is organized in the following way. Section 2 offers
a discussion of the asymmetric priming hypothesis and positions it in the context of
grammaticalization (Hopper & Traugott 2003) on the one hand and semantic priming
(McNamara 2005) on the other. Section 3 presents our methodology, which draws on
the experimental paradigm of the maze task (Forster et al. 2009). We explain how this
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technique works and how we operationalize the predictions of the asymmetric priming
hypothesis. Section 4 discusses the results. We analyse reaction time measurements
from the maze task through mixed-effects regression modeling (Baayen 2008), which
yields evidence for an asymmetric priming effect in which lexical primes slow down
the processing of grammatical forms but not vice versa. Section 5 takes a step back and
discusses whether and how the empirical observations can be reconciled with Jäger &
Rosenbach’s version of the asymmetric priming hypothesis. Section 6 concludes the
article.
2 The asymmetric priming hypothesis
How is it that semantic change in grammaticalizing forms is overwhelmingly
unidirectional? Jäger & Rosenbach (2008) suggest that semantic unidirectionality
can be explained with reference to a concept from cognitive psychology, namely
asymmetric priming. Asymmetric priming describes a pattern of cognitive association
in which one idea strongly evokes another, while that second idea does not evoke
the first one with the same force. For instance, given the word paddle, an immediate
association for many speakers is the word water. The reverse is not true: given the
word water, many speakers offer the immediate associations sea, ship, or drink, rather
than paddle. Asymmetric priming would elegantly explain the observation that many
types of meaning change in grammar proceed in one direction only: from more
specific and concrete towards more abstract and schematic, but not the other way
around. The suggestion by Jäger & Rosenbach has spawned a lively discussion. Chang
(2008) acknowledges the potential of their hypothesis, but also points out that most
documented semantic priming effects have very short durations of one second or less.
Primed with a word such as nurse in a lexical decision task, responses for doctor show
shorter latencies, but not if several words intervene between prime and target. Chang
does, however, point out that research into syntactic priming has yielded long-term
effects, which motivate a view of priming as implicit learning. On such a view, priming
effects would not be completely transient, but rather, they would be able to modify
cognitive representations of language over the long term. Further evidence of long-
term priming effects supports this idea. For example, Kaschak (2007) demonstrates
that structural priming can have effects that go beyond the immediate influence that
is reported in classic studies on syntactic priming (e.g. Bock 1986). To make this
point, Kaschak used a sentence completion task in which participants could complete
a sentence fragment in different ways. Given a fragment such as The mailman gave…,
the participants could either produce a ditransitive, direct object construction (DO –
The mailman gave the woman the letter) or the dative construction with a prepositional
object (PO – The mailman gave the parcel to the child). The participants’ behaviour
was influenced through a prior phase in the experiment, during which they were
exposed to sentence fragments that could only be completed in one way, either as a
DO construction (The car salesman sold the couple …) or as a PO construction (The
car salesman sold the minivan …). During this priming phase, Kaschak varied the
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ratio with which the participants were exposed to the two fragment types. For one
group of participants, all fragments required a DO completion. For another group,
75 per cent of the fragments required the DO construction, while the remaining 25
per cent required the PO construction. Three other groups with ratios of 50/50, 25/75
and 0/100 completed the set-up. Kaschak demonstrates that the ratio of the priming
phase significantly predicts the participants’ behaviour in the sentence completion task.
Speakers who were exposed to a ratio of 100/0 between DO and PO subsequently show
the highest ratio of DO production. The lower the DO ratio in the priming phase, the
lower the DO ratio in the sentence completion task (Kaschak 2007: 929). A view of
syntactic priming as a short-lived phenomenon would predict that speakers’ behaviour
reflects only the most recent event of relevant exposure and that speakers after that
exposure quickly regress to their normal baseline production ratio of DO and PO
constructions. Contrary to this view, Kaschak’s experiment reveals an altered ratio that
is measured over several tokens of production. Investigating the longevity of this effect,
Kaschak et al. (2011: 385) further provide evidence that speakers’ altered production
ratios are still measurable with a seven-day delay between the priming phase and
the testing phase of the experiment. We acknowledge of course that Kaschak and
colleagues investigated syntactic priming, while the asymmetric priming hypothesis
addresses a semantic phenomenon, but we agree with Kaschak et al. (2011: 386) that
it would be ‘important to know whether the cumulative priming effects observed using
different paradigms persist as strongly as they did in our current paradigm’.
Coming back to the issue of potential problems of the asymmetric priming
hypothesis, Eckardt (2008) shares Jäger & Rosenbach’s point that the causes of
language change must lie in ordinary language use. Yet, Eckardt is sceptical whether
priming effects are the crucial variable to look out for. Moreover, Eckardt doubts that
the asymmetric priming hypothesis would generate testable predictions. She argues
that the source domain of a metaphor (e.g. the domain of space) will not usually
prime the target domain (time). Hence, priming would not have any substantial role
to play in the development of the lexical verb to go into a future marker such as be
going to. Empirical counterevidence to Eckardt’s argument is offered by Williams
& Bargh (2008), who demonstrate that experiencing physical warmth does in fact
prime experimental subjects for feelings of interpersonal warmth, such as kindness
and generosity. Subjects who were given a warm cup of coffee to hold prior to
evaluating the CV of a job candidate gave more positive evaluations than subjects
who held a chilled soft drink. While these results are intriguing, Traugott (2008) raises
the question whether the semantic priming effects that are observed under controlled
laboratory conditions are also at work in ordinary conversation. All of these concerns
are valid and point to the fact that the asymmetric priming hypothesis needs further
substantiation. At the same time, it has to be pointed out that these criticisms are mostly
based on theoretical arguments only. What is needed in order to assess the asymmetric
priming hypothesis more thoroughly is an empirical engagement with the predictions
that this hypothesis generates. Unlike Eckardt (2008), we believe that such predictions
are indeed feasible. The aim of this article is therefore to re-approach the issue and
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investigate empirically whether the cognitive phenomenon of asymmetric priming can
in a satisfactory way explain why there is unidirectionality in the semantic change
of grammatical forms. Importantly, we do not want to advance the hypothesis that
asymmetric priming would be the only driving factor. What we aim to determine is
whether it is plausible to assume that it has a role to play at all.
The lack of empirical research on the putative connection between semantic
unidirectionality and asymmetric priming is regrettable for three reasons. First,
attractive though the idea might look initially, psychological investigations of
asymmetric priming (Koriat 1981; Thompson-Schill et al. 1998; Neely et al. 1998;
Kahan et al. 1999; Hutchison 2002, amongst others) have yielded mixed results that
have not been fully acknowledged in the linguistic literature. For instance, Thompson-
Schill et al. (1998) fail to find differences in priming strength in pairs such as lamp–
light or termite–wood, which could be thought to yield highly asymmetric results, with
for instance termite strongly evoking wood but wood only weakly evoking termite.
Experimental participants do show asymmetries in free association tasks (Given lamp,
which five words come to mind?), but in lexical decision tasks (Is the following a word
of English: light, frim, lamp, dunt, etc.?), reaction times are actually indistinguishable:
primed with lamp, speakers are fast to recognize light as a word, but they are just
as fast when the words are presented in the inverse order. Hence, despite the initial
appearance, it is far from clear whether asymmetric priming is robust enough as
a cognitive force to explain the substantial regularity that is observed in historical
meaning change. Second, recent psycholinguistic research on metaphorical reasoning
has yielded evidence for a phenomenon that is called source-domain activation.
Whereas Jäger & Rosenbach (2008) cite evidence that metaphorical reasoning is a
one-way street, e.g. from space to time but not vice versa (Boroditsky 2001), this has
been falsified for other metaphors. For instance, Zhong & Leonardelli (2008) show
that metaphorical reasoning from temperature to social relations (as in She gave me
an icy look) also works the other way around. Zhong & Leonardelli prompted one
group of experimental participants to imagine a scenario in which they were socially
excluded, and another group to imagine a scenario of interaction with friends. When
subsequently asked to give an estimate of the ambient room temperature, the first group
gave lower estimates, which suggests that the idea of exclusion literally made them
feel cold. Similarly, Tseng et al. (2007) showed participants a picture of a smiling
person, asking them to indicate whether that person was experiencing happiness or
joy. While these two concepts are roughly synonymous, they differ in terms of their
metaphorical underpinnings. Joy is metaphorically understood as a fluid (She was
overflowing with joy), happiness is metaphorically understood as something that is
searched for (She finally found happiness). Tseng et al. report that participants who
were drinking a liquid at the time of the survey were more likely to respond with joy,
whereas participants searching for a book in the library were relatively more likely to
respond with happiness. The task of deciding on a word for an abstract concept thus
takes recourse to the more concrete source domains of drinking liquids or searching
for something. In other words, abstract reasoning involves activation of simple,
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embodied concepts. These findings cast doubt on an explanation of grammatical
meaning change that downplays or completely denies bi-directional associations
in metaphorical reasoning. A third problem is that most research on asymmetric
priming has investigated linguistic forms that are lexical, rather than grammatical.
With the exception of Boroditsky (2001), who used experimental prompts with
temporal prepositions (before, after), which are grammatical closed-class elements, the
literature on semantic priming primarily focuses on lexical open-class elements such
as lamp–light, baby–stork, eagle–bird or joy–happiness. This is a problem because
the meanings of grammatical items are much more general and schematic than those
of lexical items, which has repercussions for the cognitive associations that these
elements will form with other elements. To illustrate, a lexical item such as toast
evokes a set of words that will be highly similar across experimental participants:
butter, breakfast, tea and so on. By contrast, a grammatical item such as because will
not elicit a similarly focused set of associated words. To make matters worse, there is
another difference between lexical and grammatical elements that pertains to meaning
change. Semantic unidirectionality is only a characteristic of grammaticalization, but
not of semantic changes that are observed with lexical elements. In the domain of lexis,
there are semantic developments that are decidedly unsystematic. To take a well-known
example, the English adjective silly used to mean ‘blessed’, and the word manager
used to refer to ‘a servant who looked after horses in the manège’ (see the etymology
sections in the Oxford English Dictionary entries for silly and manager). If most results
about asymmetric priming concern lexical elements, and lexical elements do not even
show unidirectional semantic change, that poses a severe problem for the asymmetric
priming hypothesis.
The findings reviewed above make clear that unidirectionality in the meaning
change of grammaticalizing forms is a robust empirical result that is in need of
an explanation. Asymmetric priming is a possible explanation, but there are two
problems. First, there are several theoretical arguments that cast doubt on a possible
connection between the two phenomena (Chang 2008; Eckardt 2008; Traugott 2008).
Second, the empirical research on asymmetric priming has yielded mixed results
(Thompson-Schill et al. 1998) and has furthermore focused on lexical forms, rather
than grammatical forms, which are subject to semantic unidirectionality. This means
that there is a gap between the status quo in the field and a satisfying answer to the
question whether asymmetric priming explains unidirectionality. The present article
aims to gather empirical evidence that may shed light on this issue.
3 Methodology
3.1 The maze task
Our study relies on reaction time measurements from a maze task (Forster et al. 2009;
Forster 2010), which is a task that combines self-paced reading with a forced choice
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Figure 1. Trial structure in a maze task
between two competitor words. In a maze task, subjects sit at a computer and are
presented with screens that show two words in a large font, one on the left side of
the screen, another one on the right. The subjects need to select one of the words as
quickly as possible by clicking on a key that is situated on the left or on the right of
the computer keyboard. The words have to be chosen in such a way that the words that
are selected successively combine into a well-formed sentence of English. Figure 1
illustrates the general structure of a trial in a maze task. There are six successive
screens, each with a pair of words to choose from. On the first screen, the initial
word The does not have a proper competitor, but only a dummy dashed line (----),
so that here, subjects will choose the left option. The following screen gives subjects
the choice between the words cat and some. Since the cat is a legal phrasal sequence
in English but the some is highly dubious, subjects are likely to choose the left option
once more. On the third screen, subjects have the choice between not and is, which
boils down to the competition between the cat not, which is rather unlikely, and the cat
is, which is a highly canonical beginning of a sentence. Eventually, subjects arrive at
the full sentence, in this case, The cat is on the mat.
As subjects make their way through an on-going sentence, they have to entertain
different possible syntactic parses and produce regular updates of their interpretation
of the sentence. This requires them to engage thoroughly with sentence meaning,
which is a substantial advantage of the maze task over other self-paced reading designs,
where thorough sentence comprehension has to be checked with regular verification
questions. In the words of Forster et al. (2009: 163), the maze task ‘forces the reader
into an incremental mode of processing in which each word must be fully integrated
with the preceding context before the next word can be considered’, which is exactly
what we want them to do. With each pair of words, the subjects’ choice is recorded and
reaction times are measured. Whereas some variants of the maze task abort a running
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sentence in the case of a wrong choice, the subjects in our experiment were allowed to
finish sentences even when wrong words were selected at some point during a trial.
3.2 Materials
As was discussed in earlier sections, our study tests whether asymmetric priming
obtains between lexical forms and their grammaticalized counterparts, i.e. pairs such
as go to California (lexical go) and going to think about it (grammatical be going to),
or keep the light on (lexical keep) and keep reading (grammatical keep V-ing). On
the asymmetric priming hypothesis, the former, lexical forms should prime the latter,
grammatical forms, but not vice versa. The stimuli that we presented to our subjects
are sentences such as the following, which include sequences of related lexical and
grammatical elements:
(1) The student keptlexical the light on to keepgrammatical reading.
(2) The student turnedunrelated the light on to keepgrammatical reading.
(3) The student keptgrammatical checking facebook to keeplexical up to date.
(4) The student wasunrelated checking facebook to keeplexical up to date.
The asymmetric priming hypothesis predicts that grammatical keep should be
processed faster in (1) than in (2), because in (1), the preceding instance of lexical
keep should yield a priming effect and hence a shorter response time for grammatical
keep. In (2), the first verbal element turned is unrelated to grammatical keep, and hence
there is no priming involved in the processing of the latter. While we thus expect a
difference between (1) and (2), no such difference is expected between (3) and (4). In
(3), grammatical keep precedes lexical keep, but since the grammatical element should
not facilitate the subsequent processing of lexical keep, reaction times should not differ
from a stimulus such as (4), in which the first verbal element was is unrelated to the
subsequent instance of lexical keep. The sentences above thus represent four different
conditions that we analysed in our experiment. The conditions reflect the lexical or
grammatical nature of the second verbal element and the question whether or not this
element has been primed. Example (1) illustrates the ‘primed grammatical’ condition,
example (2) the ‘unprimed grammatical’ condition. Example (3) shows the ‘primed
lexical’ condition, and finally example (4) shows the ‘unprimed lexical’ condition.
We constructed stimuli sentences on the basis of twenty different pairs of lexical
and grammatical elements, that is, pairs such as go somewhere vs be going to,
keep something vs keep V-ing, about something vs be about to, etc. Our choice of
these elements was motivated by the following considerations. First, we aimed at a
diversified portfolio of verbal, nominal, adjectival and prepositional forms, so that
different grammatical domains, such as tense, aspect, voice, modality and spatial
language, would be represented. Second, we aimed at a range of forms that would
represent a wide frequency spectrum, including both highly frequent constructions
such as the English present perfect with have and rather infrequent constructions
such as the English past habitual used to. Table 1 lists the pairs of constructions
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Table 1. Pairs of lexical and grammaticalized elements
Element Lexical usage Grammaticalized usage
about He worried about the exam. He is about to finish his thesis.
appear A shape appeared on the horizon. She appeared to know me.
back My back hurts. He came back yesterday.
better This one is better. He had better call me.
come Please come to Boston. I’ve come to really like him.
considering I’m considering a change. Considering his age, he is very fit.
far Twenty miles is too far. As far as I know, he is at home.
get Let’s get some pizza. I only got paid last Monday.
go We are going inside. It is going to rain.
happen Something terrible happened. I just happened to be in the area.
have Let’s have another round. I have seen this coming.
help He helped me with the exam. He helped me grade the exams.
keep You can keep the change. You can’t keep coming here.
long That is a very long snake. As long as you’re happy, I’m happy.
mean I wonder what she meant. I meant to call her earlier.
need I need a burger and a beer. You need to cook it for three hours.
quit John quit his job. John never quits complaining.
regret This is what I regret the most. I regret to say that this is true.
use They used a large hammer. They used to stay up all night.
wait I cannot wait any longer. I cannot wait to tell him.
that were included in our study; a full list of our stimuli sentences can be found in
the Appendix.
A brief discussion of some of the elements in table 1 is in order. First, we
acknowledge that verbal elements are overrepresented in our sample, which has
to do with the fact that verbal categories are a particularly frequent target of
grammaticalization, specifically in the domains of tense, aspect and modality. We do
not believe that the overrepresentation of verbs as such poses a general problem for
our investigation. Second, table 1 presents a categorical distinction between lexical
usage and grammaticalized usage, which does not adequately reflect our understanding
of grammaticalization as a continuous, gradient process (see Traugott & Trousdale
2010). It is clear that some of the constructions in the right-hand column of table 1
are very strongly grammaticalized (e.g. the perfect with have, the get-passive, be
going to), whereas other constructions are only weakly grammaticalized (happen to V,
wait to V, etc.). Our classification of these constructions as grammaticalized elements
is based on criteria that pertain to both form and meaning. To illustrate, a lexical
verb such as happen has very tight selectional restrictions with regard to possible
subjects and syntactic subcategorization frames. Things that happen are events such as
meetings, concerts, accidents, etc., but typically not objects or persons. Syntactically,
lexical happen is restricted to intransitive argument structure, which is sometimes
augmented with a prepositional phrase that expresses a patient (as in Something
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Table 2. Maze task sentences involving the database element happen
Primed
grammatical
Unprimed
grammatical
Primed
lexical
Unprimed
lexical
---- What Who ---- We ---- ---- We
really imagine did imagine for just for just
happened The could it no happened passed no
tiny remains tiny remains much to by reads
instruct unclear instruct unclear pass over could the
because whirl because whirl by toe window some
nobody loves nobody loves when bounce when bounce
fit happened fit happened skip the skip the
to can to can accident it accident it
cracker. notice. cracker. notice. happened. home. happened. home.
terrible happened to me). By contrast, the construction happen to V, which we view as
a weakly grammaticalized marker of non-agentivity, takes a broader semantic range of
subjects, including objects and persons, and has a more complex argument structure
that includes a to-infinitive complement. In Heine’s (1993) cline of auxiliation, happen
to V would be a stage B auxiliary, which still retains much of its erstwhile lexical
meaning, but which has already changed its syntactic behavior. Similar arguments can
be made for constructions such as help V (Lohmann 2011) or considering NP (Hopper
1991: 31).
The example sentences in table 1 are meant to be a first illustration of the
constructions we used for our study. Importantly, they are not the stimuli sentences
that our subjects saw in the experiment. The actual stimuli were constructed in such
a way that we prepared four sentences, one for each of the four conditions that we
described above, for each of the twenty elements in table 1. Each of these sentences
contains exactly ten words, and each of the ten words is matched with a competitor
word for the maze task. Table 2 presents the four sentences that we constructed for the
element happen. The sentences should be read column-by-column from top to bottom.
Words that our subjects were meant to select are printed in boldface; competitor words
are printed in normal roman font. The side of the screen on which the correct word
appeared was determined randomly. Looking at table 2, it can easily be verified that in
each case, the words in boldface build up to a meaningful sentence of English, whereas
the words in roman font either lead to downright ungrammatical structures or highly
unlikely continuations.
The sentences in table 2 illustrate that in the priming conditions, subjects saw two
instances of the verb form happened. In the unprimed condition on the other hand,
there was only one form. Crucially, the sentences in the two grammatical conditions
and the two lexical conditions differ only in the first half. In the second half, where the
critical instance of happened occurs, the respective words are fully identical, so that
any differences in response times must be a result of how the first half of the sentence
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was processed. In order to avoid exposing our subjects to highly similar sentences
twice, we distributed the stimuli across two lists of the experiment, so that for instance
list A contained the ‘primed grammatical’ and the ‘unprimed lexical’ sentences from
table 2, whereas list B contained the ‘unprimed grammatical’ and the ‘primed lexical’
sentence. By constructing four sentences for each of our twenty elements, we ended
up with 80 stimuli sentences so that list A and list B of our experiment presented our
subjects with 40 trials each.
3.3 Procedure
To implement the maze task in such a way that it could be administered to participants
on the World Wide Web, we used the QualityCrowd2 software (Keimel et al. 2012).
We used Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform to recruit 200 native speakers of
American English for the experiment, which means that all participants completed the
experiment on their own computers in an environment of their choice. The participants
signed up voluntarily and were compensated with a fee. They were told that there was
no risk, they could withdraw their participation at any time, and that personal data
would be handled confidentially. Participants who had signed up for list A could not
re-do the experiment and sign up for list B, and vice versa. We asked participants to
indicate their native variety of English, the gender with which they identified, their
age and their handedness. Before the actual experiment, the participants saw a visual
representation of the maze task and completed a training sentence. After the training,
all participants were exposed to a randomized sequence of 40 sentences with different
pairs of lexical and grammatical forms. During the experiment, accuracy and reaction
times were recorded for each response. The suitability of the Mechanical Turk platform
for reaction time experiments has been systematically investigated by Enochson &
Culbertson (2015), who replicated a number of classic laboratory-based findings in a
series of on-line experiments. We can also report that our on-line results are fully in
line with results that we obtained in a laboratory-based pilot study.
3.4 Analysis
As we will explain in more detail below, we conducted a mixed-effects regression
analysis (Baayen 2008) in which we tried to model participants’ reaction times in
terms of a series of explanatory variables. Each of the 200 participants completed
40 sentence trials, so that we were able to collect 8,000 reaction time measurements
for the critical primed or unprimed element in each sentence. In a first analytical step,
we determined for each trial whether there had been any errors. A total of 6,782 trials
(84.8 per cent) were error-free, so that we decided to discard all trials that had one
or more errors at some point in the sentence. We determined the mean and standard
deviation of the reaction time measurements and removed outliers in such a way that
all observations that differed from the mean with more than three standard deviations
were discarded. This led to the exclusion of 55 measurements, leaving us with a dataset
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of 6,727 observations (84.1 per cent). The dataset and the R code that we used for the
analysis are available upon request. The following paragraphs describe the variables
that inform our analysis and our predictions concerning the different levels of those
variables.
3.4.1 Dependent variable
Response times: the time it took our participants to respond to the critical items in
the stimuli sentences constitutes our dependent variable. The asymmetric priming
hypothesis predicts that reaction times will differ according to the preceding context
of the critical elements. After outlier removal, the mean reaction time was 1,073 ms
(sd = 545 ms). For the subsequent analysis, we used logged values of the response
times.
3.4.2 Fixed factors: predictor variables
The following paragraphs describe the variables that we included in our regression
analysis.
Priming: a first explanatory variable is the question whether or not the critical
element has been primed. We operationalized this as a binary categorical variable
with a positive value for both primed grammatical trials and primed lexical trials. The
dataset contains 3,327 observations from trials with priming and 3,400 observations
from trials without priming. Since we predict an asymmetrical priming effect, we
not only expect a facilitatory main effect of priming, but rather an interaction effect
between priming and the following variable, the distinction between lexical and
grammatical forms.
Lexical vs grammatical: this binary categorical variable captures the distinction
between the different constructions that were presented in table 1, that is, the
distinction between lexical forms and their grammaticalized counterparts, such as
lexical happen vs grammaticalized happen to V. With regard to this variable, we do
not predict any main effect, but only an interaction with priming, so that grammatical
forms that are primed by their lexical counterparts should yield short latencies,
whereas lexical forms that are primed by their grammatical counterparts should show
longer latencies.
Frequency: it is a well-established finding that highly frequent elements in language
are processed more quickly and efficiently than low-frequency elements (Bybee 2006;
Diessel & Hilpert to appear). It is therefore important to control for the fact that
the critical elements in our stimuli come from quite different frequency ranges. We
decided to operationalize frequency in terms of lemma frequency, so that the frequency
value for a form such as keep is determined on the basis of all verb forms that this
verb can produce. We determined the lemma frequencies of the elements in the first
column of table 1 in such a way that we performed exhaustive lemma searches in the
British National Corpus (Davies 2004) and recorded the frequencies. To illustrate,
the different forms of the lemma keep (keep, keeps, keeping, kept) add up to 48,194
occurrences in the BNC (482 instances per million words). We used logged frequency
values for the analysis. For our frequency variable, we predict a facilitatory main
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effect, so that elements with more frequent lemmata are processed more quickly.
We furthermore hypothesized that the variable of frequency might interact with the
variable of priming, such that highly frequent forms would not benefit as much from
priming as low-frequency forms would. Since high-frequency forms have a high
resting potential and are thus easily activated, priming might not yield a substantial
advantage here.
3.4.3 Fixed factors: control variables
The following is a list of factors that we do not predict to have any effect within the
scope of the asymmetric priming hypothesis, but that we wanted to control for.
Age: We asked our subjects to indicate their age (mean = 35.6, sd = 10.3).
Gender: All of our participants self-identified as either female (n = 112) or male
(n = 88).
Handedness: Most of our participants are right-handed (n = 174), but more than 10
per cent are left-handed (n = 26).
Language variety: because the Mechanical Turk platform is accessible via the
World Wide Web, anyone with an internet connection could have signed up for our
experiment, which is why we asked participants to name the language variety that they
identified with. Since, however, all of our participants answered ‘American English’ or
‘English’, this variable does not enter our analysis.
3.4.4 Random effects: participants and items
Mixed-effects modelling allows for the inclusion of random effects that reflect
non-systematic variation in the data. In our case, this kind of variation relates to
unsystematic differences between our participants and potential idiosyncrasies of our
linguistic stimuli. We therefore included the following variables as random intercepts
(Baayen 2008: 85–91):
Worker ID: this variable assigns an unambiguous identifier to each of our
participants.
Stimulus: this variable identifies each of our 80 sentences that were presented as
stimuli.
4 Results
We fitted a linear mixed-effects regression with reaction times as the dependent
variable, six fixed factors (Priming, Lexical vs Grammatical, Frequency, Age, Gender,
Handedness), an interaction term between Priming and Lexical vs Grammatical
and another interaction term between Priming and Frequency, and two random
factors (Worker ID, Stimulus) that we modelled as random intercepts. We used the
packages lme4 (Bates et al. 2014) and lmerTest (Kusnetsova et al. 2015) for the
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Table 3. Fixed effects in the minimal model
Estimate Std error df t-value Pr(>|t|) Sig
(Intercept) 7.034 0.116 18 60.608 0.0000 ∗∗∗
Priming_YES 0.029 0.010 6517 2.685 0.0072 ∗∗
Lex vs Gram_GRAM 0.129 0.011 6525 11.773 0.0000 ∗∗∗
Frequency − 0.021 0.010 18 − 2.007 0.0599 n.s.
Priming_YES: Lex
vs Gram_GRAM
0.071 0.015 6522 4.599 0.0000 ∗∗∗
statistical software R (R Core Team 2015). The formula for the regression model is
shown in (5).
(5) Full model
Reaction times ∼ Priming + Lexical vs Grammatical + Frequency
+ Age + Gender + Handedness
+ Priming: Lexical vs Grammatical
+ Priming: Frequency
+ (1| WorkerID) + (1|Stimulus)
In this first model, the control variables of Age, Gender, and Handedness did
not reach significance, so that they could be discarded. Furthermore, there was no
significant interaction effect between Priming and Frequency, so that this interaction
term could be taken out of the model. Tests for multicollinearity between the remaining
predictors did not indicate any problems. We thus constructed a minimal adequate
model that is based on the formula shown in (6).
(6) Minimal model
Reaction times ∼ Priming + Lexical vs Grammatical + Frequency
+ Priming: Lexical vs Grammatical
+ (1| WorkerID) + (1|Stimulus)
The regression analysis finds significant effects for Priming and Lexical vs
Grammatical, including a significant interaction between the two. The variable of
Frequency approaches significance. Both random effects are found to be significant.
A comparison based on the AIC and BIC information criteria shows no difference
between the minimal model and the earlier, more comprehensive one. The effect
structure in the minimal model is identical to the one we observed in the
first, full model. Table 3 summarizes the significant fixed effects of the minimal
model.
As the second line of table 3 shows, we observe an inhibitory main effect of priming,
which goes against our predictions. In general, forms that have been encountered
before yield longer latencies than unprimed forms. The third line of table 3 shows
another unexpected result, namely a main effect of the Lexical vs Grammatical variable
that results in longer reaction times for grammatical elements. The fourth line shows
that more frequent forms are processed more quickly, which is in line with our
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Figure 2. Reaction times in milliseconds across the four conditions of the experiment
expectations. However, it needs to be pointed out that the effect only approaches
significance. The final line of table 3 yields the result that the negative priming effect
we observed in line 2 is indeed asymmetric: grammatical elements that have been
primed with their lexical counterparts are processed relatively more slowly. Figure 2
visualizes this observation and shows average reaction times across the four conditions
of our experiment.
Figure 2 shows that on the whole, grammatical forms are processed more slowly
than lexical forms. It can also be seen that grammatical forms show a difference
with regard to priming, whereas no such difference is apparent for lexical forms.
In the two lexical conditions, on the right side of the graph, reaction times are
statistically indistinguishable – priming does not seem to make a difference. In the
two grammatical conditions, on the left side of the graph, there is a clear disadvantage
for primed forms. We thus observe an asymmetric priming effect, but contrary to
our expectations, it is a negative, inhibitory asymmetric priming effect. The question
whether lexical forms prime their grammaticalized counterparts but not vice versa
hence receives a positive answer with a twist: go actually slows down be going to,
but apparently not vice versa. The following section discusses the implications of this
result.
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5 Discussion
Our empirical results allow us to reflect on the proposal of the asymmetric priming
hypothesis in a new light. To clarify what exactly is at stake, it is worth considering the
following quotation from Jäger & Rosenbach (2008: 105):
[T]he idea we are advocating in this paper is the following: Unidirectional change
ultimately goes back to the fact that a form or a concept/meaning A primes the use of a
form or concept/meaning B if it is sufficiently similar to it, but that B doesn’t prime A. Via
repeated usage and implicit learning B will become entrenched over time. That is, what
appears as diachronic trajectories of unidirectional change is ultimately decomposable
into atomic steps of asymmetric priming in language use. It is in this way that the actions
of individual speakers may come to have a long-term impact on the shape of a grammar,
without speakers consciously conspiring to change language in a certain direction.
On the basis of this proposal, we have reasoned that an expression such as keep
the change (concept/meaning A) should facilitate the subsequent processing of keep
checking the temperature (concept/meaning B), which is in accordance with how
Jäger & Rosenbach (2008: 109) envision an empirical test of the asymmetric priming
hypothesis:
Under this view it is then possible to test any unidirectional changes that have been put
forward in the literature (see most prominently the list given in Heine & Kuteva 2002)
with respect to asymmetric priming. Very generally, the prediction is that in any reported
case of change, where the development goes unidirectionally from A to B, A should prime
B, but not vice versa.
Convinced by Jäger & Rosenbach’s reasoning, we have tried to implement an
empirical test along these lines. Contrary to our expectations, our experiment shows a
negative priming effect: speakers who have recently been exposed to lexical keep are
significantly slower to process grammatical keep, but interestingly not vice versa, so
that the priming effect is asymmetric. How could this observation be explained, and
where does it leave the asymmetric priming hypothesis?
One possible explanation would be to ascribe the effect to frequency asymmetries
between the lexical and grammatical variants of the linguistic elements we have used.
To illustrate, a weakly grammaticalized construction such as happen to V, as in I just
happened to be in town, is much less frequent than the lexical use of happen in the
intransitive construction, as in We don’t know why the accident happened. Hearing
and processing a lexical instance of happen might make it more difficult to process a
grammaticalized instance of happen just a few seconds later, since the latter would be
less strongly entrenched in the hearer’s mind because of its relatively lower frequency.
If one adopts this interpretation, the asymmetric priming hypothesis is not a possible
explanation for unidirectional semantic change in grammaticalization, since newly
grammaticalizing variants of a linguistic element are by necessity less frequent than
their lexical sources when they first start to develop. The empirical fact that semantic
change does occur and that new variants do emerge casts doubt on an explanation in
terms of frequency differentials.
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Another possible explanation for the effect we observe, and in fact one that we will
endorse in the following, is a phenomenon that is called horror aequi, which literally
translates as ‘fear of the same’ (Rohdenburg & Mondorf 2003). Our stimuli included
sentences such as The boys need new shoes that we need to buy, which are unnatural
in the sense that ordinary speakers would under normal circumstances strive to avoid
a repetition of the verb need within the space of just a few words. It is quite plausible
to assume that our participants were slower to respond to the second need because
they were mildly irritated by the repetition, even though the oral debriefing of our pilot
study showed that participants tended not to be consciously aware of these repetitions.
Now, if horror aequi is invoked as an explanation, why is this effect asymmetrical?
After all, the participants did not seem to mind a second need when that form was
lexical, as in You need to make a list of things you need. What we propose is that the
horror aequi effect is strongest for forms that have highly specific meanings and weak
to non-existent for forms that have only very general or abstract meanings. In other
words, a strongly grammaticalized form such as have in the English present perfect
construction will not deter speakers in any way from producing lexical have just a
few words later, or even immediately after the auxiliary, as its verbal complement.
The fading of horror aequi is actually a diagnostic for grammaticalization that Heine
(1993: 58ff) uses for advanced stages of auxiliation. Speakers of English may thus
use expressions such as He is going to go or He has had an idea, while ?He used to
use a typewriter or ?It happened to happen on a Tuesday are stylistically marked and
strongly dispreferred.
If this explanation is adopted, where does it leave the asymmetric priming
hypothesis? If the prediction that Jäger & Rosenbach (2008) make is correct, then
a positive priming effect should be observable in contexts where a highly general
lexical item that should not cause any substantial horror aequi effect is followed by
a grammatical item that benefits from some prior activation via priming. In our list of
stimuli, this description nicely fits the eight elements about, come, get, go, have, help,
need and use (see table 1 for an overview of the relevant constructions). We therefore
decided to take a second look at these elements in order to see whether they might, after
all, behave in a way that would be consistent with the asymmetric priming hypothesis.
We took a subset of our data, namely only the responses to about, come, get, go, have,
help, need and use in the different conditions, and computed another regression model
on the basis of the formula that we presented in (5) above. Table 4 shows the fixed
effects of that model.
Table 4 shows that in the new analysis, the main effect of negative Priming
disappears, whereas the effect of Lexical vs Grammatical persists. This means that
on the whole, grammatical forms are still harder to process than lexical forms. Also
the effect of Frequency disappears, which is most likely due to the fact that all eight
elements that enter this analysis are highly frequent. The interaction term between
Priming and Lexical vs Grammatical reaches significance and thus indicates that
primed grammatical forms are processed more slowly than unprimed ones, just as in
the full model. While the disappearance of the negative priming effect in this model is
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Table 4. Fixed effects in the model based on the reduced dataset
Estimate Std error df t-value Pr(>|t|) Sig
(Intercept) 7.447 0.397 6 18.739 0 ∗∗∗
Priming_YES 0.023 0.016 2578.1 1.386 0.165 n.s.
Lex vs Gram_GRAM 0.206 0.016 2549.7 12.386 0 ∗∗∗
Frequency − 0.055 0.032 6 − 1.699 0.1402 n.s.
Priming_YES: Lex
vs Gram_GRAM
0.054 0.024 2604.9 2.257 0.0241 ∗
a change in the right direction, the results are still far away from the actual predictions
of the asymmetric priming hypothesis. On the whole then, the evidence in this study
does not support the asymmetric priming hypothesis.
6 Conclusions
This article has addressed the hypothesis that unidirectionality in grammatical
semantic change might be due to the psychological process of asymmetric
priming, which is an empirically attested phenomenon. With regard to language
change and particularly grammaticalization, asymmetric priming would offer an
elegant explanation for the empirical observation that semantic developments in
grammaticalization overwhelmingly start with rather concrete meanings that over time
turn into more abstract and schematic meanings. It would also be in line with the
uniformitarian principle, which is the assumption that the forces that have shaped
language change in the past are the very same ones that are at work in language change
today. What this study has shown is that asymmetric priming between grammatical
constructions and their lexical sources cannot be observed in present-day speakers of
English. We have included a broad range of grammatical constructions in our analysis;
we have made sure that they cover different parts of speech, different grammatical
domains and different stages of grammaticalization, and yet the effect that we observe
has the opposite direction of what the asymmetric priming hypothesis would predict.
Does that mean that the hypothesis is falsified and should be laid to rest? We are
not completely convinced that it should. For one thing, our study has only taken
the perspective of language comprehension into account. Further psycholinguistic
experiments might focus on the speaker’s perspective, especially since it is known
that production-to-production priming is stronger than comprehension-to-production
priming (Gries 2005). In on-going work, we investigate the asymmetric priming
hypothesis on the basis of corpus data, which allows us to focus more on the role
of language production.
Another consideration that we would like to raise implies that the asymmetric
priming hypothesis might actually be impossible to falsify beyond any shadow of
a doubt. Testing it in the way we have done in the scope of this article relies on
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the uniformitarian assumption, and the assumption that cognitive processes such as
chunking, categorization or priming should have had some role to play in earlier
periods of language development seems very plausible. Yet, there are important
caveats. Trudgill (2011) convincingly argues that most of the grammaticalization
processes that have shaped the languages that are spoken today have actually taken
place in prehistoric societies that were structured very differently from today’s
societies. Specifically, there are many grammatical categories that could only have
developed in close-knit societies in which most knowledge is shared knowledge. To
illustrate this concept, Trudgill (2011: 178) mentions the pronoun system of Onya
Darat, which incorporates the distinction of whether the addressee belongs to the
same generation as the speaker, to an older generation, or to a younger generation.
Clearly, this kind of knowledge presupposes an intimate knowledge of the community
in which the speaker is living. In the modern society in which the participants of our
experiment live, much of our linguistic input comes from people we barely know,
and with whom we share relatively little knowledge. It stands to reason that speakers
in earlier times would have been subject to asymmetric priming just as we are, but
perhaps the linguistic consequences of asymmetric priming were mediated by social
contexts that were different from the ones we experience today. In other words, if
we cannot see asymmetric priming at work in language change today, we should not
hastily conclude that it never was. We thus look forward to seeing further tests of the
asymmetric priming hypothesis.
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Appendix: Stimuli
List A
The student kept checking Facebook to keep up to date.
The old man switched the light on to keep reading.
My uncle used a technique that used to work fine.
My father wanted to tell me to use a compass.
Her sister has told me that the dog has fleas.
Her daughter called a friend who has written two books.
I told him to quit his job and quit complaining.
If you don’t stop smoking you must quit the team.
He was turning back and fell flat on his back.
Yesterday my knee was hurting when I came back home.
He came here to die as I came to understand.
Yeltsin was elected as president after he came to Moscow.
As far as I know he didn’t get very far.
Madrid is too expensive as far as I am concerned.
We talked about the game that was about to begin.
John was ready to talk to me about the problem.
You need to make a list of things you need.
The boys want new shoes that we need to buy.
Mary and Frank got kids long before they got married.
The scientists were confused about the strange results they got.
Someone is going to ask you where you are going.
We are staying inside because it is going to rain.
He helped me with the party I helped to organize.
The mayor wanted to contact all neighbors who had helped.
We just happened to pass by when the accident happened.
Who did it remains unclear because nobody happened to notice.
I’m waiting for the movie I can’t wait to see.
I really want to get this letter I’m waiting for.
Bob appeared to know exactly when each Beatles album appeared.
The moon looked very large which appeared to amaze everyone.
You should consider the matter carefully considering that it’s crucial.
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Since she is highly qualified we should consider her application.
Your brother had better be careful and show better behavior.
If Mary doesn’t arrive soon we had better call home.
What he meant was that Sue hadn’t meant to leave.
They wanted to ask him what he meant by that.
I regret to say that John will deeply regret this.
I really like his rudeness as I regret to say.
Long knives are permitted as long as nobody gets hurt.
If only my mother agrees we can stay out long.
List B
My father used to tell me to use a compass.
My uncle had a technique that used to work fine.
Her daughter has a friend who has written two books.
Her sister once told me that the dog has fleas.
If you don’t quit smoking you must quit the team.
I told him to leave his job and quit complaining.
Yesterday my back was hurting when I came back home.
He was turning around and fell flat on his back.
Yeltsin came to be president after he came to Moscow.
He went to the museum as I came to understand.
Madrid is too far as far as I am concerned.
The officer was convinced that he didn’t get very far.
John was about to talk to me about the problem.
We waited for the game that was about to begin.
The boys need new shoes that we need to buy.
You have to make a list of things you need.
The scientists got confused about the strange results they got.
Mary and Frank had kids long before they got married.
We are going inside because it is going to rain.
Someone is calling to ask you where you are going.
The posters helped to contact all neighbors who had helped.
He was talking about the party I helped to organize.
What really happened remains unclear because nobody happened to notice.
We just passed by the window when the accident happened.
I can’t wait to get this letter I’m waiting for.
I’ve rented out this movie I can’t wait to see.
The moon appeared very large which appeared to amaze everyone.
Bob seemed to know exactly when each Beatles album appeared.
Considering that she’s highly qualified we should consider her application.
You should plan the matter carefully considering that it’s crucial.
If Mary doesn’t get better we had better call home.
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Your brother needs to be careful and show better behavior.
They meant to ask him what he meant by that.
What he thought was that Sue hadn’t meant to leave.
I really regret my rudeness as I regret to say.
I have to say that John will deeply regret this.
As long as John agrees we can stay out long.
Sharp knives are permitted as long as nobody gets hurt.
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